Cuba’s energy crisis in 2026 is a pattern, not a single power cut: long daily outages in many areas, repeated collapses of the whole national grid, and a power system with very little spare capacity left when anything goes wrong.
This explainer separates confirmed facts from contested causes. The outages — their length, effects, and the repeated grid collapses — are reported by Reuters, the Associated Press and Cuba’s own utility. The causes are disputed: Havana blames US pressure and fuel restrictions; Washington blames Havana’s economic management. Each account is attributed below, and disagreements in the reporting are stated openly.
What is happening
Cuba runs a single national electricity system, operated by the state utility Unión Eléctrica (UNE). When demand exceeds supply, UNE cuts some areas in rotation. When a fault spreads faster than operators can contain it, the whole system can disconnect until restarted section by section. Both failures have happened repeatedly in 2026.
Reports put the number of nationwide collapses in 2026 at six, seven or eight, depending on what is counted. This article gives no single total. The pattern — repeated total disconnections in one year — is not in dispute.
One collapse is documented in detail. On 18 September 2026 the grid disconnected entirely after a failure in high-voltage transmission lines in the west, on the authorities’ account as reported by the Associated Press and Reuters. By dusk, power had returned to only about 5% of customers in Havana (about 862,000 customers in total, per the Associated Press). Small isolated systems were set up in Camagüey, Pinar del Río and Granma, with hospitals reactivated first.
The daily outages are what most Cubans live with. Reuters reported on 23 October 2026 that outages ‘often exceed 18 hours a day in the capital’, Havana. Other 2026 reporting described up to 20 hours a day in parts of the island, and over 30 hours in individual stretches, per Associated Press reporting on the September collapse. These figures come from different places and weeks; no national average is given in the reporting checked. What reports agree on is the scale: for much of 2026, many Cubans have spent most of each day without power.
In short: a total grid collapse on 18 September 2026, daily outages often over 18 hours in Havana in October (Reuters), up to 20 hours in parts of the island, and a disputed count of six to eight nationwide collapses in 2026.
Why blackouts happen: a grid with no margin
A grid must balance supply and demand every second. Cuba’s grid, as described in the reporting, has lost that margin in two ways: less electricity is generated than the island needs at peak times, and the plants and lines that remain are more likely to trip.
First, the generation shortfall. Cuba’s power comes mainly from thermoelectric plants burning fuel oil and diesel, plus smaller generators and, increasingly, solar parks. When fuel is scarce, plants cannot run at full output, or at all. When several large units are offline at once — for breakdowns, maintenance, or lack of fuel — supply falls well below demand, and UNE must cut supply to large parts of the island. That is the daily blackout: a controlled cut, imposed because there is not enough generation.
Second, fragility. A resilient grid absorbs the loss of a large generator; reporting describes Cuba’s system as unable to do so, so a single plant trip or line fault can cascade into a total disconnection, as on 18 September.
Ageing equipment is part of this fragility in every account. Reuters described the blackouts as ‘exacerbated by failing infrastructure’, and the Associated Press has described plants needing weeks of maintenance. The Antonio Guiteras plant in Matanzas, Cuba’s largest, has repeatedly gone offline in 2026, including in March, when the utility blamed a breakdown there for a failure affecting two-thirds of the island. Solar helps in daylight, but output falls in the evening when demand peaks, and reporting does not suggest it has closed the deficit.
Why outages last so long is a separate question from why they start. Restarting a collapsed grid is slow: plants return in sequence and sections are re-energised one at a time. A tripped plant may need repair first, which takes longer when fuel and spare parts are scarce. Daily outages last until enough generation is available to supply that circuit again — on high-deficit days, most of the day.
The contested causes: two accounts
The Cuban government’s account: US pressure and fuel restrictions
The Cuban government maintains that United States sanctions and restrictions are the primary driver of the hardship, and that the fuel restrictions imposed in 2026 turned a chronic shortage into an emergency. That is the position Havana has taken at the United Nations.
The sequence Havana points to begins in January 2026. On 29 January, President Donald Trump signed an executive order, ‘Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba’, declaring a national emergency and establishing a process for tariffs on imports from any country that directly or indirectly provides oil to Cuba. The White House fact sheet called it protection of US national security from the Cuban regime’s ‘malign actions’. UN experts and analysts said the practical effect was to deter suppliers, shippers, insurers and banks from dealing with Cuba.
Venezuela is central to this account. Cuba has long depended on imported oil, historically above all from Venezuela, producing only part of what it needs. Reuters reported in October 2026 that US pressure stepped up after the US military in January seized then-Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in what Reuters called a deadly raid, and that Venezuelan shipments fell away under that pressure; Mexican supplies also came under US pressure, other reporting said. Havana says only limited oil arrived in 2026. Shipment volumes were not independently verified for this article, and no figure is stated as fact.
UN human rights experts condemned the 29 January order on 12 February 2026. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) quoted them calling it ‘a serious violation of international law’, with ‘no right under international law to impose economic penalties on third States for engaging in lawful trade with another sovereign country’. In June 2026, High Commissioner Volker Türk called for sanctions to be lifted, saying severe sanctions with broad, indiscriminate effects were ‘incompatible with basic principles of international human rights law’. Those are the experts’ assessments, reported as their views.
The United States government’s account: management and a failing system
The United States gives a different account. Reuters reported on 23 October 2026 that ‘the US says the now nine-month fuel blockade is necessary to upend Cuba’s government, which it calls inept and corrupt’. The 29 January White House fact sheet said Cuba aligns itself with hostile states and groups, hosts foreign military and intelligence capabilities, and represses dissent. Mr Trump has said his goal is to fundamentally change Cuba’s government, and labelled Cuba a ‘failed state’ at the UN General Assembly in September 2026, Reuters reported.
On this account, the crisis results from decades of mismanagement and a power system already failing before 2026 — plants without adequate maintenance, investment and spare parts, and too little foreign currency to buy fuel and equipment. Supporters point out that the grid already collapsed island-wide in 2024, before the January 2026 measures, and outages were already severe in 2025 — collapses the reporting checked confirms, in October and December 2024 and again in 2025.
Neither account explains away the other’s central fact. The infrastructure account does not explain why fuel deliveries fell so sharply in early 2026; the fuel-restriction account does not explain why a grid already collapsing in 2024 would have been resilient in 2026 even with fuel. On the evidence checked, both pressures are documented — an ageing, fragile system, and a sharp restriction of fuel supply in 2026 — and their relative weight is contested. Any claim that one factor alone caused the crisis is an argument, not an established fact.
For wider context on fuel-price shocks, see our report on US consumers and the $471 fuel-price study and our analysis of Trump’s approval rating in the Reuters/Ipsos poll.
Daily life: water, hospitals and telecoms, as reported
A blackout is not only the loss of light: water pumping, refrigeration, communications and hospital equipment all need electricity, and backup generators need fuel.
Water is the most widely reported knock-on effect. The Associated Press reported that outages disrupt water supply, and reporting on the September collapse described residents left without water as well as electricity. When pumping stops, networks lose pressure, and households must store water or turn to less reliable sources. Reporting in September 2026 citing United Nations estimates described millions of people having difficulty obtaining safe water regularly; that figure is attributed to those UN estimates as reported, and this article has not verified the underlying assessment independently.
Hospitals are given priority when power returns — the Associated Press reported systems serving hospitals and emergency facilities among the first reactivated after the September collapse — but priority is not immunity: generators need diesel. Reporting in 2026 described hospitals struggling to function normally, with food and medicine scarcer, and Mr Türk said in June 2026 that oncology, dialysis and maternal health were under severe strain, with essential medicines in critical short supply. Reuters reported teachers at a Havana special-education school moving children with low vision closer to windows or into courtyards during blackouts; it was one of 330 such schools the government said remained open.
Telecommunications are also affected, the Associated Press reported. First-hand reporting from Havana in October 2026, by the independent outlet 14ymedio and translated by Translating Cuba, described residents gathering near a telecoms tower to find a mobile signal, with mobile data intermittent in parts of the capital. No reliable island-wide figure was found in the reputable reporting checked, and none is stated. Without refrigeration, food spoils — fishermen in Pinar del Río described selling catches immediately or losing them — and transport has suffered, with fewer buses and rationed or closed petrol stations, per 2026 reporting.
What happens next
The immediate question is whether fuel reaches the island and the grid can be stabilised. On 23 October 2026, Reuters reported Mr Trump saying the US would ‘take care of Cuba’ after dealing with Iran and would send Secretary of State Marco Rubio ‘to finish the deal’, having predicted the previous month that the two countries would reach an agreement without military action. Cuba’s foreign minister told the UN General Assembly the previous month that Cuba would always be open to dialogue, the same report said. No agreement had been announced as of 28 October 2026.
What would change the electricity picture is more generation at peak times: fuel, working plants, and spare parts. The 2026 midterm elections on 3 November will shape the domestic context for US Cuba policy, but no outcome is predicted here. This page will be updated on the same URL if the grid position changes materially or an agreement is announced. Figures are as reported up to 28 October 2026; UNE’s daily figures change every day.
Frequently asked questions
Why does Cuba have blackouts?
Because the electricity available is often well below demand at peak times. Fuel shortages limit generation, several large units are often offline at once, and the grid has little spare capacity. The relative weight of fuel restrictions and of ageing infrastructure is contested — see the two accounts above.
Why do the blackouts last so long?
Daily outages last until enough generation is available to supply a circuit again — on high-deficit days, most of the day. After a total collapse, restoration is sequential, and any plant needing repair must be fixed first, slower when fuel and spare parts are scarce.
How many nationwide blackouts has Cuba had in 2026?
Reports differ, with counts of six, seven or eight depending on what is counted. This article uses no single total because the reporting checked does not agree on one.
Is the crisis caused by US sanctions or by Cuba’s own infrastructure?
Both factors are documented, and the two governments disagree on which matters more. Havana says US fuel restrictions are the primary driver; Washington blames Havana’s management. This article attributes each account and does not settle the dispute.
Updated: 28 October 2026. Figures are as reported up to this date and change daily. For the current grid position, check UNE’s latest daily report and same-day Reuters and Associated Press coverage.